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    <title>Institutional Economics</title>
    <link>http://www.institutional-economics.com/index.php/section/index/</link>
    <description></description>
    <dc:language>en</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>stephen_kirchner@institutional-economics.com</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>Copyright 2010</dc:rights>
    <dc:date>2010-09-02T00:53:09+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Fundamentals of Australian House Price Inflation</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/fundamentals_of_australian_house_price_inflation/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets, House Prices</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a lot of ill-informed offshore commentary about Australian house price inflation, with anecdotal reports suggesting that some hedge funds are putting on trades designed to capitalise on what they see as an inevitable Australian house price bust. </p>

<p>We have heard all this before from a local debate about house prices that goes back to at least 2003 and substantially predates international interest in this issue since 2007. In 2005, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111766233843548579,00.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries" title="Robert Shiller">Robert Shiller</a> declared that Australia had suffered a burst housing bubble the previous year, a proposition that has become even more laughable with the passage of time. </p>

<p>Chris Joye reviews the latest data in his <a href="http://www.rismark.com.au/pdf/Macsec_5.pdf" title="presentation for offshore investors">presentation for offshore investors</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-09-02T01:53:09+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>The Broken Windscreen Fallacy</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/the_broken_windscreen_fallacy/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Fiscal Policy</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2010/09/01/clunkers_a_classic_government_folly/" title="policies">policies</a> the current caretaker government would like to emulate:</p>

<blockquote><p><i>When all is said and done, Cash for Clunkers was a deplorable exercise in budgetary wastefulness, asset destruction, environmental irrelevance, and economic idiocy. Other than that, it was a screaming success</i>.</p></blockquote>
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      <dc:date>2010-09-02T00:00:38+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>How Much Stimulus is Too Much?</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/how_much_stimulus_is_too_much/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets, Fiscal Policy</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/30/economics-paul-krugman-stimulus-opionions-columnists-richard-epstein.html" title="Richard Epstein">Richard Epstein</a> wants to know.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-09-01T02:42:37+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Fiscal Policy After the Election</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/fiscal_policy_after_the_election/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets, Fiscal Policy</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/saddled-with-legacy-of-fiscal-extravagance/story-fn59niix-1225911594527" title="Tony Makin">Tony Makin</a> argues in The Australian that:</p>

<blockquote><p><i>Whichever side forms government, it will have to live with the legacy of the fiscal extravagance since October 2008. Just as present budgetary actions have implications for future economic activity, past actions have economic implications for the present and the near future.</p>

<p>Questions that will most likely arise during the term of the next government include the following: Why are long-term interest rates and the cost of obtaining funds from abroad continuing to rise? Why is private investment not improving as expected? Why is future economic growth now likely to be lower than otherwise? Why are inflationary pressures continuing to build?</p>

<p>The answer to each of these questions is the same. It&#8217;s either mostly, or partly, due to the excessive fiscal stimulus of the past two years.</i></p></blockquote>

<p>My view is that activist fiscal policy in Australia and abroad will have negative consequences through a rather different channel: a negative wealth effect from increased government debt that will weigh on economic growth and consequently lower rather than raise long-term interest rates globally. I made this argument in a recent <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/business/bond-market-vigilantes-should-weigh-risks-of-continued-inactivity-20100412-s43b.html" title="op-ed">op-ed</a>. Recent developments in global long-term interest rates have been consistent with this view.</p>

<p>For those interested, I will be discussing these issues as part of a panel at this year&#8217;s <a href="http://www.ace10.org.au/" title="Australian Conference of Economists">Australian Conference of Economists</a> on the topic of &#8216;Monetary-Fiscal Interactions: How to Improve Policy Outcomes.&#8217; Other panellists include Don Brash (ex-RBNZ), Jacopo Cimadomo (ECB), Carl Wash (UCSC) and Jan Libich (La Trobe).
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-30T02:30:15+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Political Insiders and Anti&#45;Gaming Wowsers</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/political_insiders_and_anti&#45;gaming_wowsers/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets, Politics</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are calls to <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/call-for-ban-on-election-bets/story-fn59niix-1225909604173" title="ban political insiders from election betting markets">ban political insiders from election betting markets</a>. Apart from the usual anti-gaming wowsers like Nick Xenophon, I suspect this is motivated by the same mistaken notion of fairness that supports anti-insider trading laws in relation to equity securities. As Henry Manne&#8217;s work has shown, anti-insider trading laws are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of markets. <a href="http://jackman.stanford.edu/blog/?p=1747" title="Simon Jackman">Simon Jackman</a> notes that a ban on political insiders would be impractical, but this is no less true of anti-insider trading laws in general.</p>

<p>It is interesting to note that for all the reports of trading by political insiders, prediction markets got the election outcome &#8216;wrong&#8217; in an ex post sense. While the betting market odds bounced around with the polls, they consistently gave a strong probability to a Labor win, while the polls suggested a tighter contest. </p>

<p>This is not necessarily anomalous, because they measure different things. Polls measure vote shares, but these translate only very loosely into seats won and the ability to form government, so betting markets can quite reasonably imply results that are not obviously supported by the polls. Still, the polls were a better guide to the overall result than the prediction markets on this occasion (have not looked at individual seat markets).</p>

<p>My guess is that political insiders are little better than noise traders. We should be happy to let the market professionals milk them for all their worth.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-26T05:36:43+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Low Expectations: Why Financial Markets Didn&#8217;t Care About the Election Result</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/low_expectations_why_financial_markets_didnt_care_about_the_election_result/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets, Politics</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Financial markets usually take federal election outcomes in their stride, an indication that the result is either not a surprise or makes very little difference to expected economic and financial outcomes.</p>

<p>The fact that markets have been just as sanguine when faced with the prospect of a hung parliament for the first time since 1940 implies that markets do not expect public policy outcomes to be appreciably worse under the various options for a minority or (small &#8216;c&#8217;) coalition government than under a majority government. One can only conclude that markets had very low expectations for the public policy outcomes from any majority government and those expectations have not in any way been disappointed by a hung parliament.
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-24T04:51:02+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>The Future of US Housing Finance</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/the_future_of_us_housing_finance/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Peter Wallison&#8217;s <a href="http://www.american.com/archive/2010/august/when-economic-policy-became-social-policy" title="gloomy thoughts">gloomy thoughts</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-24T04:04:13+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Bonfire of Kevin Rudd&#8217;s Vanity</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/bonfire_of_kevin_rudds_vanity/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Politics</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Whoever forms government in the wake of Saturday&#8217;s federal election, the result is as comprehensive a repudiation of Kevin Rudd and his legacy as one could reasonably hope for. Any suggestion that Kevin Rudd&#8217;s liquidation as Prime Minister in June was a net negative for the ALP withstands little scrutiny. It is ill-advised for members of the conservative side of politics to suggest otherwise or confect sympathy over the manner of Rudd&#8217;s demise. We should always be thankful to the ALP caucus for taking the action they did in removing a dysfunctional central planner from office. Perhaps the highlight of last night&#8217;s election coverage was the ABC&#8217;s decision to cut Kevin Rudd off mid-speech as the producers realised that amid the usual profusion of words coming out of his mouth, he had nothing to say. Rudd suffered a 9% primary swing against him in his own seat.</p>

<p>The election result is one that Malcolm Turnbull said could never happen if the Coalition failed to join a bipartisan policy cartel behind Kevin Rudd&#8217;s ETS. Malcolm&#8217;s stand undoubtedly helped him in Wentworth, where he now sits on a massive 60% of the primary vote. What Malcolm never understood and what Tony Abbott demonstrated was that public opinion on the ETS was not independent of the opposition&#8217;s stand on the issue. Ironically, Rudd dropped the ETS for the same reason Malcolm supported it: neither of them wanted to fight an election on the issue. </p>

<p>Any new government will now be hostage to some combination of Greens and rural protectionists. Unfortunately, both have a common interest in frustrating economic and other reforms. While there is now little prospect of good legislation coming out of any new government, it will also be difficult to push bad legislation through such a finely balanced legislative process. Legislative and policy paralysis are underrated as political outcomes and could even set the stage for new elections in which real policy issues might actually be at stake.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-22T04:06:45+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Sydney: Too Many People in 1912?</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/sydney_too_many_people_in_1912/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Population &amp; Migration</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have an <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/commentary/city-got-big-but-never-grew-up/story-e6frgd0x-1225907040578" title="op-ed">op-ed</a> in today&#8217;s Australian referencing an article in the Sydney Morning Herald from 1912 about how Sydney&#8217;s then transport system supposedly could not cope with a population of 700,000.</p>

<p>The text below the fold is a slightly longer version that went out on Friday in the Ideas@TheCentre series. You can subscribe to Ideas@TheCentre <a href="http://www.cis.org.au/media-information/e-news/user" title="here">here</a>.
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-19T00:51:23+00:00</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>The $389 Billion Third Rail of American Politics</title>
      <link>http://www.institutional&#45;economics.com/index.php/weblog/the_389_billion_third_rail_of_american_politics/</link>
      <description></description>
      <dc:subject>Economics, Financial Markets</dc:subject>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The US Treasury Department convened a conference on the vexed issue of housing finance reform. Remarkably, even the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/business/17sorkin.html?_r=2&amp;ref=business" title="New York Times">New York Times</a> saw straight through the politics of GSE reform in its reporting on proceedings:</p>

<blockquote><p><i>The consensus was that neither Democrats nor Republicans wanted to touch an issue that would dredge up decisions made by both parties over the last decade that looked bad in light of the financial crisis. Fannie and Freddie was now the third rail of American politics.</i></p></blockquote>

<p>&#8216;Looked bad&#8217; doesn&#8217;t even begin to cover what has been a catastrophic failure of America&#8217;s political institutions for which there has been little or no accountability. </p>

<p>The de facto nationalisation of US housing finance through its Congressional-mandated GSEs may have been a catastrophe for the US, yet for <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-08-17/gross-urges-full-nationalization-of-housing-finance.html" title="PIMCO&#8217;s Bill Gross">PIMCO&#8217;s Bill Gross</a>, nothing succeeds like failure:</p>

<blockquote><p><i>Bill Gross, who runs the world&#8217;s biggest bond fund at Pacific Investment Management Co., said the U.S. should consider &#8220;full nationalization&#8221; of the mortgage- finance system&#8230;</p>

<p>&#8220;To suggest that there&#8217;s a large place for private financing in the future of housing finance is unrealistic,&#8221; Gross said today at a U.S. Treasury Department conference in Washington. &#8220;Government is part of our future. We need a government balance sheet. To suggest that the private market come back in is simply impractical. It won&#8217;t work.&#8221;</i></p></blockquote>

<p>Gross conveniently ignores the fact that the housing GSEs have effectively been on the books of the US government for their entire existence.
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:date>2010-08-18T00:51:24+00:00</dc:date>
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